Geopolitics, Aid and Growth by Dreher, Axel et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U n iv e rs i t y  o f  H e i de l b er g  
Discussion Paper Series    No. 575  
482482 
Department of Economics 
 
Geopolitics, Aid and Growth 
 
Axel Dreher, Vera Eichenauer, 
and Kai Gehring  
October 2014 
Geopolitics, Aid and Growth 
 
 
 
Axel Dreher* (Heidelberg University, University of Goettingen, KOF, CEPR, CESifo, IZA) 
 
Vera Eichenauer (Heidelberg University) 
 
Kai Gehring (University of Goettingen, Heidelberg University) 
 
October 2014 
 
Abstract: We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of 
foreign aid. Specifically, we test whether the effect of aid on economic growth is reduced by the 
share of years a country has served on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the 
period the aid has been committed, which provides quasi-random variation in aid. Our results 
show that the relationship of aid with growth is significantly lower when aid has been 
committed during a country’s tenure on the UNSC. We derive two conclusions from this. First, 
short-term political favoritism reduces growth. Second, political interest variables are 
inadequate as instruments for overall aid, raising doubts about a large number of results in the 
aid effectiveness literature. 
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“UNSC membership offers a quasi-experiment 
to assess the impact of unconditional aid.” 
(Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010) 
 
1. Introduction 
For a new paper investigating the impact of aid on economic growth it may be good practice to 
begin with an apology for adding to such an immense literature. However, the debate on 
whether or not foreign aid is effective in promoting growth in recipient countries is ongoing 
and heated, arguably because the literature lacks an accepted identification strategy. While we 
do not offer recipes to estimate a causal effect of aid on growth, we propose a test to distinguish 
between the effects of aid granted while a country benefited from extraordinary political 
leverage and the effects of aid granted at other times. While the effect of favoritism on how aid 
promotes growth is interesting in its own right, our paper also offers important insights for 
those studies in the aid effectiveness literature that use political alignments to identify the 
effects of aid. 
Most of the previous literature relies on three strategies to identify the effect of aid on 
growth (or other potential consequences of aid).1 First, researchers use instruments for aid that 
mainly rely on the recipient country’s population size. Second, they employ internal 
instruments in the context of difference or system GMM estimations. Third, they base the 
analysis on instruments that proxy for the geopolitical importance of a recipient country to the 
donor, implicitly or explicitly generalizing the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) to be 
representative of all aid, rather than political aid exclusively.2 The first two estimation strategies 
                                               
1 A number of recent contributions does not fit these groups. For example, Galiani et al. (2014) instrument 
aid flows with the International Development Association’s (IDA) threshold for receiving highly 
concessional aid. Werker et al. (2009) make use of oil price fluctuations that substantially increase the aid 
budgets of oil-producing Arab donors, in particular to Muslim countries. While we are convinced of 
Werker et al.’s identification strategy, in particular, their results can hardly be generalized to represent 
the effects of aid more broadly. As they point out, their results show the LATE for oil-price-induced 
increases in aid to Muslim countries, which might be unrepresentative for aid by a broader set of donors 
to a broader set of recipients. The results in Galiani et al. (2014) refer to the small set of countries crossing 
the IDA-threshold. 
2 The number of papers falling in this category is too large to cite them all. A number of recent papers use 
(changes in) voting alignment between the donor and recipient in the United Nations General Assembly 
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violate the exclusion restriction. Clearly, population size and lagged aid can affect growth 
through channels other than contemporaneous aid.  
The third strategy requires assuming that the effects of aid are independent of the 
donors’ motives for granting it. This might be reasonable. Donors who have already committed 
a certain amount of aid might be keen to achieve developmental outcomes, independent of the 
motive for granting aid in the first place (Rajan and Subramanian 2008). Kilby and Dreher (2010) 
raise doubts about this homogeneity assumption. Their results show that donor motives 
influence the effectiveness of development aid in promoting growth.3 Several reasons might 
explain such a difference. Arguably, if donors are motivated by pure self-interest, their 
allocation decision does not depend on the way the recipient uses the aid. A politically 
motivated allocation of aid may result in the approval of lower-quality aid projects in favored 
countries instead of more promising projects elsewhere. Donors may fail to include growth-
promoting policy conditions or wave them in case of non-compliance. Favoritism might thus 
allow projects to be pursued where important preconditions are not met or might reduce the 
time and resources devoted to the preparation of a project. The recipient might choose to use 
disbursed aid for purposes other than development if punishment for non-compliance is less 
likely,4 resulting in on average inferior outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                       
(e.g., Creasey et al. 2011, Aurore and Maurel 2013, Bjørnskov 2013, Midtgaard et al. 2013). Others use 
temporary membership in the United Nations Security Council, which is in the focus of our paper 
(Christensen et al. 2011, Breitwieser and Wick 2013, Drometer 2013). 
3 They do not propose exogenous instruments to identify causality, however, but rely on system GMM 
estimations (with the exclusion restriction being unlikely to hold, see Bazzi and Clemens 2013). A handful 
of other studies consider the impact of donor characteristics on aid effectiveness (Bobba and Powell 2007, 
Headey 2008, Bearce and Tirone 2010, Minoiu and Reddy 2010, Bermeo 2011). 
4 Focusing on the IMF and the World Bank, Stone (2008), Kilby (2009) and Nooruddin and Vreeland 
(2010) suggest that political favoritism undermines the credibility of conditionality, rendering it 
ineffective. Nooruddin and Vreeland (2010) show that democratic countries under IMF programs 
increase public wages and salaries when they serve on the UNSC, while governments without UNSC-
related political leverage have to reduce their wage bill. This suggests that politically important countries 
can avoid tough conditionality. Stone (2004) and Kilby (2009) show that IMF and World Bank conditions, 
respectively, are not rigorously enforced in politically important recipient countries (measured by UNGA 
voting patterns, among others). Kilby (2011, 2013) finds that political leverage reduces the time used to 
prepare World Bank projects, which in turn reduces the quality of these projects. 
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If geopolitical aid or aid given to recipients with political leverage more generally is less 
effective than other aid,5 the literature using political connections as instruments would not 
provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of overall aid, but rather of aid given to politically 
important countries. Their estimates would represent a lower bound for the effects of overall 
aid. The lack of a convincing test for differential effects of these types of aid is thus an important 
gap in the literature. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap.  
We investigate whether aid given to temporary members of the UNSC is less effective in 
promoting growth than aid given at other times. In measuring the amount of aid received by a 
country at times of extraordinary political importance, we connect to the recent literature 
investigating the effects of temporary membership on the UNSC. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 
(2010) show that temporary members grow more slowly while serving on the UNSC. They 
attribute this to the adverse consequences of development aid, given that these temporary 
members receive substantial additional inflows of aid during their terms on the UNSC 
(Kuziemko and Werker 2006, Dreher et al. 2009a, 2009b). However, the results in Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith reflect the effects of membership per se, and seem to be independent of the 
amount of aid received (Bashir and Lim 2013).6 It thus remains unanswered whether aid 
granted during temporary UNSC membership results in different developmental outcomes 
than aid given at other times. 
Dreher et al. (2013) investigate the effect of temporary UNSC membership on the 
evaluation of World Bank projects. Their results show that project evaluations are on average 
not inferior for projects granted to countries while being on the UNSC. It is only during times of 
macroeconomic crisis that politically motivated aid reduces the probability of a positive 
evaluation. In contrast to our paper, Dreher et al. focus on one (multilateral) donor and 
investigate the effect of geopolitics on self-assessed project outcomes rather than on economic 
growth. We take a broader approach and reconsider recent models of aid effectiveness to 
                                               
5 Overall aid is composed of an (unknown) share of politically motivated aid and, arguably, some share 
exclusively given for developmental purposes, among others. See Werker (2012) for more on the political 
economy of foreign aid. 
6 As pointed out by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2013), the effects of “easy money” can take many 
routes, among them, as they show, loans to the temporary UNSC members. 
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distinguish between aid given to countries of short-term geopolitical importance and aid 
granted at other times. In contrast to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), we do not relate 
UNSC membership per se to the variables of interest, but exploit the quasi-random variation in 
the amount and the implementation modality of aid at the time of temporary UNSC 
membership to investigate whether the effectiveness of these flows is different from aid granted 
at other times. 
Augmenting Clemens et al.’s (2012) permutations of Burnside and Dollar (2000) and 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008), we find that the effect of aid on growth is reduced by donors’ 
geopolitical motives. This result holds for the model of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010). It 
is more pronounced in autocratic recipient countries and holds if we restrict the sample to 
Africa, which follows the strictest norm of rotation on the UNSC and can thus most reliably be 
regarded as exogenous. Overall, we find that political favoritism reduces aid effectiveness. This 
renders political variables inadequate as instruments for overall aid. 
The next section describes how we exploit temporary membership on the UNSC to 
identify the effects of political motives, outlines our data and method of estimation, and 
presents the main results. Section 3 extends the basic analysis, while the final section draws 
policy implications and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data, method, and main results 
Our proxy variable for political importance is a measure that has been shown in previous 
research to induce political favoritism: temporary membership on the UN Security Council. 
Among the potential proxy variables for political influence, this measure poses the fewest 
problems.7 Membership positions are scarce, the nature of service is temporary and not 
                                               
7 Other measures suggested in the literature include voting patterns in the UN General Assembly, formal 
alliances or military support, colonial relationships, stronger geopolitical constraints during the Cold War 
period compared to more recent years, and ad hoc classifications of “good” versus “other” or “bad” 
donors. None of these measures is suitable to identify causal effects of politically motivated aid given that 
they vary little and slowly over time, so that most of the variation in these measures comes from the 
cross-sectional dimension. 
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immediately renewable, and the selection process is exogenous to aid (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith 2010, Dreher et al. 2014).8  
While five members of the UNSC (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) serve on a permanent basis, ten temporary members are elected by the UN 
General Assembly. These elected members serve two-year terms. While not random, 
membership appears to be largely idiosyncratic, with varying regional norms (Dreher et al. 
2014): African nations typically rotate; Latin America and Asia hold competitive elections where 
regional hegemons win most often; Western Europe mixes rotation and competitive elections; 
and since the end of the Cold War, Eastern Europe shows no systematic pattern. The two-year, 
not immediately-renewable term reinforces the exogeneity of the selection process. 
Our analysis closely follows the approach in Clemens et al. (2012), adding our variables 
of interest to their models. Clemens et al. show that the most prominent previous attempts to 
control for the potential endogeneity of aid rely on invalid instruments.9 Instead of suggesting 
more valid ones, they address the potential endogeneity of aid by differencing the regression 
equation and lagging aid, so that it can reasonably be expected to cause growth rather than 
being its effect. Thus, they assume that the main (short-term) effects of aid on growth occur, on 
average, one period after its disbursement. We base our analysis on their permutations of 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008) – the two studies that arguably 
gained most attention in the recent literature on aid and growth. We also re-estimate the 
                                               
8 For our work, the importance of previous research on what determines election to the UNSC cannot be 
over-emphasized. If selection to the UNSC depends on those same variables that also affect aid and 
economic growth, our results would be biased. While countries become politically or economically more 
important over time, the amount of aid they receive and their rates of economic growth could 
simultaneously increase. For example, countries being temporary members of the UNSC might be able to 
draw the world’s attention to their legitimate developmental needs, giving them access to additional 
funds that are unrelated to political motives. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Dreher et al. (2014) 
test this possibility: They find that election to the UNSC is clearly not related to the variables that also 
affect the amount of development aid a country receives. Thus, conditional on the variables in our 
models, UNSC membership can be considered as providing exogenous variation that we can use to 
identify the temporary geopolitical importance of a country for exactly its two years of membership. See 
also Besley and Persson (2012). 
9 Bazzi and Clemens (2013) show in more detail that previous papers in the aid effectiveness literature 
rely on weak instruments – including those relying on internal instruments using “black box” GMM 
estimations. 
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specifications in Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), which are closely related to the question 
we address here, and which gained considerable attention in the academic literature and the 
media alike.10 While we believe (as do Clemens et al. 2012) that OLS regressions are superior to 
2SLS with questionable instruments, we stress that our estimate of whether aid affects growth 
could be biased in either direction,11 and we largely refrain from interpreting the aid-growth 
relationship as causal. There is, however, no reason to expect a systematic bias for our 
coefficient of interest, the interaction of aid with UNSC membership for any given level of aid.12 
We thus adopt the regression-based OLS approaches of these prominent previous analyses,13 
and add development aid and its interaction with temporary membership on the UNSC to the 
equations of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), and temporary membership and its 
interaction with aid to those of Clemens et al. (2012).14 
In terms of timing, we follow Clemens et al. (2012) and assume that disbursed aid takes 
one four-year-period to become effective to increase or decrease economic growth.15 We also 
assume that bottlenecks in the donor and recipient administrations prevent aid from being 
disbursed immediately, so that the bulk of aid committed in one four-year-period is disbursed 
                                               
10 E.g., Hosli et al. (2011), Bashir and Lim (2013). 
11 For example, donors might grant more aid to a new reform-oriented government. Increased growth 
resulting from these reforms could then spuriously be attributed to the increases in aid. On the other 
hand donors might give more aid to countries where they anticipate shocks to reduce future growth 
rates. 
12 This interpretation relies on the formal analysis in Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2012). Also see Nunn 
and Qian (2013). Nunn and Qian refer to section 2.3.4 of Angrist and Krueger (1999) for a technical 
discussion. 
13 Unlike Clemens et al. and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith we cluster standard errors at the recipient 
country level in all our specifications. Our results are not affected by this. 
14 As an alternative approach, one could think of instrumenting for aid with temporary membership on 
the UNSC. We do not pursue this route for two reasons. First, temporary membership is rare – the 
instrument thus has low power. More importantly, instrumenting aid with UNSC membership can only 
give us the LATE – in this case, the effect of aid given while a country was of short-term geopolitical 
importance. However, we are interested in the difference of the effectiveness of strategic aid compared to 
aid given at other times. 
15 As summarized in Headey (2008), aid affects growth most substantially 5-9 years after it has been 
disbursed, on average. If aid is disbursed evenly over time, the average positive distance between a dollar 
being disbursed and growth in the contemporaneous four-year-period is 16 months (Roodmann 2007, 
Headey 2008). Headey thus lags aid by one four-year period, so that the average positive distance 
between disbursements and their potential effects is 5 years and 4 months. 
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one period later, on average.16 Based on these assumptions about the lag structure of the growth 
effects of aid we are interested in growth rates two periods after UNSC membership. Regarding 
the potentially harmful consequences of geopolitical motives, this would imply that aid 
committed in period (t), which is disbursed in period (t+1), is less effective in promoting growth 
in period (t+2) the more years a country has spent on the UNSC in period (t). Arguably, UNSC 
membership can also have more instant or contemporaneous effects on growth, depending on 
the exact channel that explain the reduced aid-growth correlation. We empirically test the 
possibility of different timings in a series of additional regressions. 
Figures 1-3 provide a first impression of the data. The patterns are in line with our 
assumptions about the most likely timing. Figure 1 shows that aid commitments (in constant 
2000 million US dollars) from all DAC-donors in a specific four-year-period are substantially 
larger for countries that have served (one or two years) on the UNSC, compared to countries 
that did not serve. They are also larger compared to commitments received by temporary 
members in the period prior to serving on the UNSC, and compared to commitments one 
period after serving (these differences are statistically significant at the one-percent level). 
Figure 2 shows net aid disbursements (also in constant 2000 million US dollars) conditional on 
UNSC membership, but lags membership by one four-year-period. The data support the 
assumed pattern: Commitments increase in the contemporaneous four-year-period of 
membership; the accompanying disbursements increase in the period following UNSC 
membership. Thus, aid commitments during UNSC membership seem to be disbursed on 
average one period later. Both commitments and disbursements move back to their initial levels 
in periods (t+1) and (t+2) respectively. Overall, the effects coincide with UNSC membership, 
and disappear after the temporary member loses its extraordinary geopolitical importance. 
                                               
16 For example, a 1999 report of the British House of Commons’ Select Committee on International 
Development reports a delay between European Commission aid commitments and disbursements at the 
end of the 1990s of almost five years (cited in Odedokun 2003: 7). See OECD (2003) for an in-depth 
discussion of reasons for delayed disbursements. 
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Figure 1: Aid commitments and temporary UNSC membership (t) 
  
Figure 2: Aid disbursements and temporary UNSC membership (t) 
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Figure 3: GDP per capita growth and temporary UNSC membership (t) 
 
Figure 3 shows mean yearly growth rates of per capita GDP for different lags of UNSC 
membership. The first bar displays the growth rates for countries that have never been a 
member of the UNSC. The other bars show the growth rates for different lags of UNSC 
membership: Growth during UNSC membership, one period before, one period later, two 
periods later, and three periods later. The figure supports the notion that compared to countries 
that have never served on the UNSC, UNSC members subsequently experience lower growth 
rates. That is, in line with Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), we find that UNSC membership 
correlates with lower growth rates. Still, as expected, the lowest growth rates are experienced 
two periods after UNSC membership. Also note that growth rates increase to almost the level of 
the pre-UNSC period in the period after UNSC membership. It thus seems that the 
commitments made while being on the UNSC are not disbursed in sufficient amounts in the 
next period, on average, to substantially decrease growth in that period.  
 This pattern supports our hypothesis that the increased aid committed in period (t) 
during temporary UNSC membership [figure 1], which is disbursed in large parts in period (t+1) 
[figure 2], has an adverse effect on growth in period (t+2) [figure 3].17 While these descriptive 
                                               
17 When we directly test the effect of aid commitments rather than disbursements in our models below, 
we find no significant effect on growth. Commitments are not usually used in the aid effectiveness 
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statistics imply no causality, their pattern lends support to our story. We illustrate the timeline 
derived from our considerations in figure 4. We test different timings as a robustness check 
further below. 
Figure 4: The proposed timeline 
 
Next we turn to our econometric specifications. Following Clemens et al. (2012) our reduced-
form empirical model is at the country-period level:  
 
     ℎ ,  = α+β    ,   +γ    ,   
  +δ     ,   +ζ    ,   *     ,   +η  , +  ,  (1) 
 
where Growthi,t is a country i’s average yearly real GDP per capita growth over period t. Aidi,t-1 
denotes the amount of aid (as a percentage of GDP)18 disbursed in the previous period; UNSCi,t-2 
indicates the share of years country i was a temporary member of the UNSC two periods 
                                                                                                                                                       
literature, as only those parts of the commitments actually disbursed can affect the outcome variable. We 
also looked at the correlation between disbursements and commitments and find them to be higher for 
temporary UNSC members than for non-members. This shows that the extent to which the respective 
commitments are actually disbursed is lower for non-UNSC members than for UNSC members. The 
blurred distinction between UNSC and non-UNSC members makes it less likely to find significant effects 
when using commitment data. 
18 We focus on aid from all donors for two reasons. First, UNSC membership has been shown to be 
important for the allocation of aid from most of the largest donors (see Vreeland and Dreher 2014 for an 
overview). Given that these donors account for the bulk of aid we do not want to exclude some donors on 
an ad hoc basis. To the extent that these donors do not provide more aid to countries on the UNSC this 
does not bias our results. Second, aid by single donors, or a subset of them, is usually not sufficiently 
large to be measurable in terms of growth. Still, we replicated our results focusing on aid from the largest 
donor – the United States – separately, as we describe in more detail in footnote 34. 
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before.19 We expect that aid commitments are, on average, disbursed one period later. Hence, 
when using lagged aid we twice-lag temporary membership on the UNSC (UNSCi,t-2). All 
regressions include the complete set of contemporaneous control variables used by the 
respective previous studies, which is denoted Xi,t.20 Our preferred specification also includes aid 
squared to test for decreasing returns to aid, again following Clemens et al. (2012).21 Finally, εi,t 
is the error term.  
Equation (1) is in levels and thus does not address the potential endogeneity of aid to 
economic growth. We therefore base our conclusions mainly on a regression in first differences 
to control for time-invariant omitted variables, as in Clemens et al. (2012).22 Equation (1) then 
becomes: 
 
Δ     ℎ ,   = α+βΔ    ,   +γΔ    ,   
  +δ     ,   +ζΔ    ,   *     ,   +ηΔ  , +  ,  (2) 
 
Again, we report specifications with and without a squared aid term. According to 
Clemens et al. (2012), the appropriate method to test the effect of aid on economic growth 
accounts for the non-linear effect of aid, removes country fixed-effects through first-
differencing, and lags aid by one period. As they argue, this minimizes potential 
                                               
19 We exclude the permanent UNSC members from the analysis. 
20 To reduce clutter, we do not show them in all tables. Burnside and Dollar include: Initial GDP/capita, 
Ethnic Fractionalization, Assassinations, Ethnic Fractionalization*Assassinations, dummies for Sub-
Saharan Afric and East Asia, Institutional Quality, M2/GDP (lagged), Policy, and period dummies. Rajan 
and Subramanian: Initial GDP/capita, Initial Policy, (log) Initial Life Expectancy, Geography, Institutional 
Quality, (log) Inflation, Initial M2/GDP, Budget Balance/GDP, Revolutions, Ethnic Fractionalization, 
period dummies and dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia. The original studies include time-
invariant variables that are removed in (2) below (as in Clemens et al.) through taking differences. 
Appendix A reports the sources and definitions of all variables, while we show descriptive statistics in 
Appendix B. Appendix C reports the full specifications for the main regressions. 
21 It could be argued that temporary UNSC membership should be interacted with aid squared as well. 
Political motivation would then not only change the level of the marginal effect of aid, but also its slope. 
Such an interaction effect, however, is not significant in our preferred specification (the p-value being 0.82 
in the BD sample and 0.22 in the RS sample). Detailed calculations are available on request. 
22 Clemens et al. do not explain why they prefer the first-differences regressions over fixed effects 
regressions. 
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misspecification due to reversed causality between aid and growth, and omitted variables 
bias.23 This is our preferred estimation strategy.24 
The regression of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) is a slightly different one. The 
dependent variable in Bueno de Mesquita and Smith is again the growth rate of per capita GDP 
over a four-year-period. However, they compare the difference in growth over these four years 
for countries that have been a temporary member of the UNSC in the first year of a period to 
those countries that have not been members in the same period. Rather than including a 
measure of aid, they estimate the effect of a dummy indicating UNSC membership per se and 
attribute its effect to foreign aid (or other types of loose money, see Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith 2013). We use their baseline specification, and add the UNSC and aid variables, and the 
interaction of these variables to the equation. The model is thus no longer in first-differences, 
but instead includes country fixed effects in the main regressions. The lag structure replicates 
our approach above.25 
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the results for the Burnside and Dollar (BD) regressions on 
the extended data of Clemens et al. (2012), covering the 1970-2005 period. All data are averaged 
over four years. The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per 
                                               
23 In addition, they seem to prefer a measure of early-impact aid over all aid. This measure has been 
shown not to be a robust predictor of growth (Rajan and Subramanian 2008, Bjørnskov 2013). What is 
more, a major drawback with this measure is that disaggregated aid disbursements are not available for 
the entire period, so that disbursements have to be estimated based on commitments. Data on 
commitments in the earlier periods also suffer from severe underreporting, which is not addressed in 
Clemens et al. (2012) (see OECD/DAC CRS Guide, Coverage Ratios, accessed on March 3, 2014: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/crsguide.htm). We therefore prefer to focus on overall aid. To the extent 
that parts of aid are not systematically related to growth, the larger noise reduces the probability that we 
find a significant effect. As outlined above, we lag disbursements by one period to account for timing. 
24 One could argue that UNSC membership should be included in differences instead of levels. To us, it 
seems intuitive that the level rather than changes in UNSC membership conditions the effectiveness of 
changes in aid. Nevertheless, when we first-difference UNSC membership, the results are similar. The 
interaction remains negative and significant at the one-percent level in the BD sample, and significant at 
the ten-percent level in the RS sample. 
25 We use the share of temporary UNSC membership lagged by two four-year periods, aid disbursements 
as a percentage of GDP lagged by one period, and their interaction. Consistent with the original setup, 
the four-year periods in this specification can be understood as moving averages. For example, growth in 
the 1991-1994 period is related to aid disbursements in the 1987-1990 period. 
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capita; aid is measured as net Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GDP.26 
Column 2 focuses on Clemens et al.’s permutations of Rajan and Subramanian (RS) to test 
whether our results are due to the specific setup of the BD specifications. The RS regressions use 
data averaged over five years, and the extended sample of Clemens et al. (2012) covers the 1971-
2005 period.27 Before we turn to testing specification (1) (described above), we use the first two 
columns to focus on the effect of contemporaneous aid disbursements, conditional on UNSC 
membership in the previous period, and omit aid squared. While the table reports the variables 
of interest only, we report the full model for our preferred specifications (columns 7 and 8) in 
Appendix C. 
As can be seen in column 1, the interaction between aid and the share of years the 
recipient has been a temporary member of the UNSC in the previous period is not significant at 
conventional levels. This is intuitive, as we cannot expect the effect of disbursements on growth 
to be immediate (Clemens et al. 2012). However, according to column 2 the coefficient is 
significant at the ten-percent level in the RS sample, suggesting a negative effect of political 
motivations even for contemporaneous aid. Part of the aid committed in the previous period 
might already have been disbursed (and affected growth) in that period or the modes of aid 
delivery – project preparation, conditionality etc. – of previously committed aid might have 
changed. 
Columns 3 and 4 show how the timing of the aid-variable affects the outcome. When we 
lag aid by one period, we consequently lag the share of years a country is a member on the 
UNSC by two periods (as shown in equation (1) above but excluding aid squared). As Clemens 
et al. argue, this should substantially raise the coefficient of aid. While the coefficients of the aid 
variable are not significant at conventional levels, they do increase in magnitude. The resulting 
interaction between temporary UNSC membership and aid is negative and significant at the 
                                               
26 The original source for GDP per capita growth is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators; 
ODA is total net ODA in current US$ from Table 2 of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in 
percent of GDP in current US$, taken from the World Development Indicators (see the Technical 
Appendix to Clemens et al. 2012).  
27 The data for per capita GDP growth are originally calculated based on the Penn World Tables, updated 
by Clemens et al. for the year 2005 using the World Development Indicators. Net ODA is measured in the 
same way as in the BD regressions (see the Technical Appendix to Clemens et al. 2012). 
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ten-percent level in the BD specification (column 3), but not significant in the model of RS 
(column 4).  
Note that aid by itself is not significant at conventional levels in any of the four 
specifications. This is in line with the results in Clemens et al. (2012) and clearly does not imply 
that aid is ineffective. If more aid is given to countries which are in greater need, and if those 
tend to have lower growth rates, the insignificant coefficients for aid might reflect this 
relationship rather than the absence of positive effects of aid on growth. If aid and growth are 
persistent over time, this holds whether or not we use lagged values of aid.  
We next turn to our preferred estimations, which first-difference the dependent and the 
explanatory variables except membership on the UNSC (equation 2). This specification takes 
account of systematic time-invariant differences between members and non-members of the 
UNSC and their effect on growth. We report specifications excluding aid squared (columns 5 
and 6) and including it (columns 7 and 8), to account for potentially diminishing returns to aid. 
The results support our hypothesis that aid granted during times of short-term political 
importance is indeed less effective.28 When we do not account for diminishing returns to aid by 
including aid squared, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at the 
five-percent level in the BD specification (column 5) and negative and significant at the ten-
percent level in the RS specification (column 6). When we include aid squared,29 the interaction 
becomes significant at the one- and five-percent level, respectively (columns 7 and 8).30  
                                               
28 Also note that UNSC membership is negative and significant at the ten-percent level according to 
columns 5 and 7. This implies that UNSC membership reduces growth even in the absence of any aid. 
This is broadly in line with Bashir and Lim (2013), who find a direct effect of UNSC membership on 
growth controlled for aid inflows. The effect is however not robust. If we control for the (first-differenced) 
set of institutional variables provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) the coefficient of 
UNSC is no longer significant at conventional levels, while the coefficient of the interaction term stays 
significant at the one percent level in our preferred specification (of column 7). 
29 Part of the literature on the effect of aid on growth argues that aid squared has to be included in a 
meaningful growth regression, e.g., Durbarry et al. (1998). However, see Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) 
for a critique. 
30 We also tested whether the effect differs when we take only important years of UNSC membership into 
account, as suggested in Kuziemko and Werker (2006). The results for the BD specification remain 
unchanged; in the RS specification the interaction term becomes insignificant, however. This is not 
surprising given that their measure is based on US newspapers and thus measures the importance of the 
UNSC predominantly for the United States rather than the average donor. 
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Figure 5: Marginal effect of changes in aid disbursements on changes in economic growth conditional on 
changes in aid disbursements and varying temporary UNSC membership (based on Table 1, column 7). 
The histogram shows the distribution of ΔAid in the regression sample. Note that the significant 
interaction term in the regression shows that these marginal effects differ significantly from each other. 
The derivation of the marginal effects can be found in Appendix D. 
 
Figure 5 shows the marginal effects for the BD model and the 90%-confidence intervals.31 As can 
be seen, the marginal effect of changes in aid on changes in growth depends on the magnitude 
of the change in aid and on membership on the UNSC. The effect declines for higher values of 
ΔAid, reflecting diminishing returns to aid.32 For any value of ΔAid, the effectiveness of aid 
decreases with the number of years the recipient country has spent on the UNSC two periods 
before (i.e., when the aid has been committed). The average effect of a 1 percentage point 
increase in aid as a percentage of GDP on yearly economic growth is 0.61 percentage points 
                                               
31 A similar figure for the RS model is available on request. 
32 The marginal effect of a change in aid is linear in the lagged difference and in the twice-lagged level of 
aid (see Appendix D). 
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higher if the recipient has not served on the UNSC compared to if it has served two years (i.e., 
1/2 of the four-year-period). The aid-growth relationship is positive for countries that have not 
served on the UNSC when aid has been committed,33 while being largely insignificant for 
countries that have served one year, and significantly negative for those that have served two 
years and for which the increases in aid exceed 3 percent of GDP. 
Table 2 reproduces the regressions in first differences (including aid squared) focusing 
on Africa only. African nations follow the strictest norm of rotation on the UNSC among all 
regional election caucuses, making the exogeneity of UNSC membership particularly hard to 
challenge (Dreher et al. 2014). The results are similar to those for all countries, as shown above. 
The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant at the five-percent level in the 
Burnside and Dollar regressions. The coefficients in the Rajan and Subramanian specification 
are, however, no longer significant at conventional levels. This is potentially due to the 
substantially smaller sample, and the fact that the five-year periods used by RS make it more 
difficult to capture the correct timing as proposed in our timeline.34 
In Table 3 we turn to the model of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (BdM/Smith).35 
Column 1 includes fixed effects for years and regions, but not for countries. As can be seen, 
                                               
33 This holds unless the change in aid exceeds 10 percent of GDP. 
34 As a substantial share of politically motivated aid inflows come from the United States, we replicated 
the analysis focusing on US aid only. This comes with two potential problems that might bias against 
finding a significant interaction: First, overall US aid might be politically motivated to a larger extent than 
ODA from all donors. It could then be difficult to differentiate between the growth-effects of normal aid 
and aid given during the recipient‘s time as temporary UNSC member. Second, it might not be possible 
to detect significant effects when focusing on aid from one donor exclusively as such aid might be 
insufficiently large to measurably affect growth. Our results are similar to those for all aid, but generally 
weaker: The interaction terms remain negative in the main regressions, but become significant at the one-
percent level only in the BD specification in the Africa sample. Interestingly, however, we find a negative 
and significant effect at the one and ten-percent level respectively for autocratic countries. This supports 
the notion that the adverse effects of politically motivated aid are a particular concern in autocratic 
countries, which might not receive any aid without UNSC membership (see section 3 below). 
35 Their source for GDP per capita growth is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2007), 
measured in constant 2000 US$. Aid is measured as net official development assistance in percent of GDP 
and comprises aid from all sources (also taken from the World Development Indicators 2007). All 
regressions include as explanatory variables: (log) population size, (log) per capita GDP, the level of 
democracy and its interaction with UNSC membership (as do the main specifications in Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith 2010). Note that contrary to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith we exclude high-income 
countries (as defined by the World Bank) from the sample, as they do not receive any aid. Again, we 
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countries that were temporary members of the UNSC at the beginning of a four-year-period do 
not experience significantly different rates of growth.36 In column 2 we lag temporary 
membership on the UNSC by two periods. As can be seen, the twice-lagged effect of UNSC 
membership does not reduce growth at conventional levels of significance, indicating that 
UNSC membership per se does not hurt growth. 
In accordance with our timeline, we again assume that aid which is committed while a 
country is on the UNSC gets disbursed with a lag of about one four-year-period and affects 
economic growth in the period following disbursement. Column 3 adds aid lagged by one 
period, twice-lagged UNSC membership and their interaction to the equation. Column 4 shows 
the same specification, but restricts the sample to Africa. The results are in line with those 
above, with the interaction between UNSC membership and aid being negative and significant 
at the five- and one-percent level respectively.  
In columns 5-8 we replace the region-fixed effects with dummies for each country and 
add regional quartic time trends (as in Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). It is thus the more 
rigorous specification, as it accounts for potential time-invariant omitted variables, different 
forms of regional trends, and common yearly shocks. The results are broadly in line with those 
above. While the interaction between aid and membership on the UNSC is negative but not 
significant at conventional levels for the overall sample (column 7), it is negative and significant 
at the one-percent level in the regressions focusing on Africa (column 8). As explained above, 
African countries provide the most reliably exogenous variation in politically motivated aid; 
thus a causal interpretation of this result is most warranted. Overall, our results support the 
hypothesis of an adverse effect of political interests on aid effectiveness. That is, politics 
matter.37  
                                                                                                                                                       
restrict the table to the variables of main interest and report the full specification for our preferred model 
in Appendix C. 
36 This is contrary to the results of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010). Unlike them, we cluster standard 
errors at the recipient country level. Without clustering, the negative coefficient is significant at the ten-
percent level. 
37 We also run separate regressions for the period of the Cold War and the post-Cold War period. As 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) show, the importance of colonial ties diminishes with the end of the Cold 
War. Headey (2008) also shows that bilateral aid became more effective after the end of the Cold War, in 
line with Dunning’s (2004) analysis of how aid affected the spread of democracy. If donors gained greater 
20 
 
The next section extends the main analysis by separately investigating democratic and 
autocratic recipients of aid and investigating possible transmission channels. 
 
3. Extensions 
As Nooruddin and Vreeland (2010) argue, UNSC votes of democratic countries provide greater 
legitimacy and are thus more valuable than those of non-democratic ones. Democracies should 
consequently have particular leverage while serving on the UNSC, potentially reducing the 
effectiveness of aid more strongly than aid given to autocracies. On the other hand, Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2010) report the adverse effects of UNSC membership to be stronger in 
autocracies. This is because, on average, the potential to misuse aid is higher in autocracies. On 
balance, we expect a more pronounced interaction effect in autocracies. In the next set of 
regressions we investigate the effect of politically motivated aid in democracies and autocracies 
separately, measured according to the indicator of Cheibub et al. (2010).  
Table 4 reports the results for the BD and RS specifications, while Table 5 shows them 
according to the specification of BdM/Smith. In Table 4 we focus on those regressions that 
control for time-invariant omitted variables by first-differencing the equation. For the BD 
sample the negative interaction is significant at the one-percent level in autocracies (columns 3 
and 7) and larger than in democracies, where it is significant at the ten-percent level when aid 
squared is included (column 5) and insignificant without aid squared (column 1). In both 
models, the negative coefficients are substantially larger in magnitude in autocracies than in 
democracies. The RS specifications show positive coefficients for democracies and negative 
coefficients for autocracies, all failing to reach statistical significance however. 
Table 5 shows a similar picture for the BdM/Smith specification, where only the 
interactions in autocracies have a negative coefficient. The negative effect is significant when we 
control for regional and time fixed effects (column 3). When we add time trends and country 
                                                                                                                                                       
leverage to enforce conditions after the end of the Cold War, and the accompanying risk of losing an ally 
to the opposing bloc decreased, we would expect the effect of geopolitical aid to be particularly harmful 
during the Cold War era. Indeed, the negative coefficient of the interaction term is larger during the Cold 
War era for the BD and RS sample; for the BdM/Smith sample there are no obvious differences visible. 
We also tested whether politically motivated aid is particularly harmful in times of economic crises, as 
suggested in Dreher et al. (2013). We find no systematic difference. 
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fixed effects in column 4 the coefficient remains negative but turns insignificant. In democracies 
the interaction turns positive and significant at the five-percent level with region fixed effects 
(column 1), and insignificant with country fixed effects (column 2). Overall, the greater political 
legitimacy of democratic countries’ votes on the UNSC does not seem to drive the results. Our 
results suggest that in autocratic countries which have potentially less interest in promoting 
development, the reduced pressure to use development aid for developmental purposes during 
UNSC membership might be particularly harmful. Given that autocracies are, on average, 
countries where the potential role of the donor in pushing for change is most prevalent, the 
adverse consequences of politically motivated aid are particularly unfortunate. 
The results so far support our proposed timeline. However, this does not preclude other 
timings to be potentially important. Thus, Table 6 reports results from regressions that examine 
whether and to what extent other possible timings are supported by the data.  
To test these possibilities, we replicate the regressions of Table 1, columns 7 and 8, for 
the BD and RS specifications respectively using alternative timelines. For BdM/Smith we focus 
on the specification of column 7 in Table 3. We test if the effectiveness of aid disbursed in 
different periods is affected by UNSC membership in the same period, one period before, and 
two periods before. For example, if aid disbursed during UNSC membership is less effective if 
the country has been on the UNSC in the previous period, contemporaneous membership could 
affect compliance via conditionality.  
While Table 6 shows the coefficients and standard errors of the interaction terms only, 
note that the respective aid, aid squared and UNSC variables are also included in each 
regression (as are the remaining control variables). We also report the coefficients following our 
previously proposed and theoretically most likely timeline (Aidt-1*UNSCt-2) for comparison. As 
can be seen, all other interactions are not significant at conventional levels, except the 
specification following BdM/Smith (column 3) for Aidt-1*UNSCt-1. The table shows that the 
interaction is significant at the one-percent level, with a negative coefficient. This result implies 
that part of the aid committed during membership gets disbursed in the same period and is 
thus less effective one period later. Overall, and in particular for the BD and RS specifications 
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that employ a more rigorous set of control variables than BdM/Smith, the regressions support 
our proposed timeline, and thus the theoretical considerations underlying it. 
What can explain these results? The previous literature identified a number of 
transmission channels for individual donors. Dreher et al. (2013) showed that political motives 
reduce the quality of World Bank projects. Also for the World Bank, Kilby (2011) reported that 
political allies are allowed to start projects with inferior preparation. Stone (2008) found that 
political favoritism undermines the credibility of IMF conditionality.  
In order to test these transmission channels in our broader sample of aid by all DAC 
donors, we would require data on aid conditionality and compliance with these conditions, 
project success, and time and resources invested in project preparation. These data do not exist 
for a broad sample of donors. Data exist, however, on different aid modalities and the sectoral 
composition of aid across recipient countries on and off the UNSC. Previous research argues 
that the effectiveness of aid depends on the sector the aid is given to and the modalities through 
which it is delivered (Cordella and Dell'Ariccia 2007, Clemens et al. 2012, Bjørnskov 2013). To 
the extent that UNSC membership affects composition and modalities,38 the effectiveness of aid 
would change.  
While a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, Table 7 reports the amount 
of aid committed to the individual sectors while countries have been temporary members of the 
UNSC and at other times (in constant million 2011 US$). As can be seen, there are substantial 
differences between countries on and off the UNSC. Table 7 also reports a t-test for equality of a 
certain category’s share in total aid committed to UNSC members and non-members. The 
results show that the share increases significantly in 7 of the 26 sectors, and decreases in one 
sector. For example, UNSC members receive larger general budget support (+46%), more aid for 
other social infrastructure (+105%), larger food aid (+59%), and less emergency aid (-39%). 
According to Nunn and Qian (2013), US food aid increases the risk of civil conflict. Bjørnskov 
(2013) shows that a category of aid that includes emergency aid increases growth. Both 
                                               
38 Bayer et al. (2014) provide initial evidence. Their results show that countries prefer to work with UN 
agencies rather than the World Bank in implementing projects under the Global Environment Facility 
while being on the UNSC. 
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increases in food aid and reductions in emergency aid are thus likely to reduce the effectiveness 
of aid. 
Strong differences also arise when we focus on the type of aid, as we show in Table 8. 
The results indicate increases in all types of aid for temporary members of the UNSC. In 
particular, budget aid increases by 192% during UNSC membership, while the increase in 
project aid is 95%. Loans increase by 137% and grants by 32%. The increases of these types of 
aid in a recipient’s overall aid are all statistically significant at the one-percent level. Note that 
budget support is the type of aid that offers most flexibility to the recipient government and is 
thus particularly attractive to use for political reasons. To the extent that these different types of 
aid affect economic growth differently (e.g., Cordella and Dell'Ariccia 2007), the different 
composition of aid might also explain the effect that we identified in this paper. 
While we leave further explorations of the exact channels that explain the lower 
effectiveness of aid given to countries of short-term geopolitical importance for future research, 
these descriptive statistics show striking differences in how certain types of aid and aid to 
specific sectors change as a consequence of a country's changing political importance. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we addressed the question of whether a recipient’s short-term geopolitical 
importance reduces the effectiveness of its aid receipts. We made use of a straightforward proxy 
for the geopolitical importance of a country. Specifically, we exploited the quasi-random 
variation in aid commitments and modalities of delivery resulting from the recipient being of 
extraordinary geopolitical importance during its temporary membership on the UNSC. The 
previous literature has shown that temporary members of the UNSC receive substantial and 
unusual increases in aid (Kuziemko and Werker 2006, Dreher et al. 2009a, 2009b). To the extent 
that political motives for the allocation of aid affect its consequences, the aid a country receives 
while serving on the UNSC should be less effective on average. The literature also found that 
the time spent to prepare aid projects, the number of aid conditions as well as punishment of 
non-compliance with such conditions differ for politically important aid recipients. Overall, we 
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therefore expect aid given to countries of short-term political importance to be less effective in 
promoting growth than aid given at other times. 
Rather than suggesting our own econometric model, we augmented three widely cited 
specifications from the literature (Burnside and Dollar 2000, Rajan and Subramanian 2008, 
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010) with our exogenous measure (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith 2010, Vreeland and Dreher 2014) of politically motivated aid. Our results show that aid 
granted while a recipient has been a member of the UNSC is less effective in terms of increasing 
economic growth. This holds in particular in autocratically governed recipient countries. It also 
holds when we restrict our sample to African countries, which follow the strictest norm of 
rotation on the UNSC. That is, foreign aid granted to countries of short-term geopolitical 
importance is less effective than aid granted at other times particularly in those places where 
development would be most needed.  
While we did not aim to rigorously test whether aid is effective, but rather, whether aid 
effectiveness is reduced due to the short-term political importance of recipients, our findings 
have direct implications for the existing and future aid effectiveness literature. To the extent the 
reader accepts the regressions presented in Clemens et al. (2012) and Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith (2010) as causal tests for the effectiveness of aid, our results imply that overall aid tends 
to increase growth, while aid granted to countries of geopolitical importance is insignificant, or 
even harmful to growth. In any case, aid to important countries is less effective than aid given at 
other times. Political motives channel more aid to temporary UNSC members whose 
subsequent growth rates might increase to the extent that the marginal effect of aid remains 
positive. This increase would however come at the cost of reduced aid and larger losses of 
growth elsewhere.  
An important implication of our results relates to the identification strategy in the 
previous aid effectiveness literature, much of which tries to identify the causal effects of overall 
aid by instrumenting for aid using political variables. Our results show that geopolitical 
variables are invalid as instruments for overall aid when “political aid” is different.39 The results 
                                               
39 See also Fleck and Kilby (2006), Headey (2008), Bearce and Tirone (2010), Minoiu and Reddy (2010), 
Kilby and Dreher (2010), and Faye and Niehaus (2012). 
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of previous studies aiming to identify the effect of all aid on growth by relying on variation 
caused by changing political alliances thus have to be treated with caution. More specifically, 
our results show that the estimated effects of politically motivated aid – mistakenly reported as 
effect of all aid in these studies – represent the lower bound of the true effect of all aid. 
In terms of increasing the effectiveness of aid, there are arguably two possibilities. First, 
foreign aid could be separated from political motives, so that it truly becomes “development 
aid.” Given the incentives of donors to use aid to achieve their geopolitical goals this is unlikely 
to happen. Second, the exact channels by which geopolitical motives reduce the effectiveness of 
aid should be identified. The choice of a suitable remedy would depend upon which of the 
channels outlined above is responsible for the reduced effectiveness of aid. We leave such 
analysis for future research. 
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Table 1: Politically motivated aid and growth, OLS, BD and RS 
  Burnside and Dollar Rajan and Subramanian 
 (1)  (2)  
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Aid (t) 0.010 (0.033) -0.004 (0.040) 
UNSC (t-1) 1.171 (0.888) 0.854 (1.283) 
UNSC (t-1)*Aid (t) -0.045 (0.116) -0.361* (0.203) 
First difference? No No 
Adj. R-Squared 0.30 0.32 
Number of Observations 418 432 
 (3)  (4)  
Aid (t-1)  0.056 (0.045) 0.005 (0.056) 
UNSC (t-2) 0.255 (0.973) -0.501 (1.058) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1) -0.329* (0.166) 0.010 (0.149) 
First difference? No No 
Adj. R-Squared 0.31 0.30 
Number of Observations 418 432 
 (5)  (6)  
Aid (t-1) 0.121 (0.095) 0.149* (0.085) 
UNSC (t-2) -1.679* (0.903) -0.866 (1.420) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1) -0.927** (0.429) -1.094* (0.590) 
First difference? Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.18 0.30 
Number of Observations 361 351 
 (7) (8)  
Aid (t-1) 0.453** (0.189) 0.356** (0.148) 
Aid (t-1) squared -0.010** (0.004) -0.007 (0.004) 
UNSC (t-2) -1.649* (0.992) -0.947 (1.402) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1) -1.222*** (0.369) -1.365** (0.647) 
First difference? Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.29 0.31 
Number of Observations 361 351 
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita. All “Burnside and Dollar” regressions include Initial 
GDP/capita, Ethnic Fractionalization, Assassinations, Ethnic Fractionalization*Assassinations, dummies for Sub-
Saharan Africa and East Asia, Institutional Quality, M2/GDP (lagged), Policy, and period dummies. The dependent 
variable covers the 1970-2005 period (corresponding to Clemens et al. 2012, Table 7, columns 1 and 7). All “Rajan and 
Subramanian” regressions include Initial GDP/capita, Initial Policy, (log) Initial Life Expectancy, Geography, 
Institutional Quality, (log) Inflation, Initial M2/GDP, Budget Balance/GDP, Revolutions, Ethnic Fractionalization, 
period dummies and dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia. The dependent variable covers the 1966-2005 
period (using the full extended sample provided by Clemens et al. 2012, Table 9). Standard errors in parentheses 
(clustered at the recipient country level). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 2: Politically motivated aid and growth in Africa, OLS, BD and RS 
 Burnside and Dollar Rajan and Subramanian 
 (1) (2) 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Aid (t-1) 0.138 (0.105) 0.026 (0.126) 
UNSC (t-2) -1.243 (1.760) -1.506 (3.905) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1) -1.448**  (0.650) 0.092 (1.425) 
First difference? Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.15 0.31 
Number of Observations 103 94 
 (3) (4) 
Aid (t-1) 0.239 (0.178) 0.247 (0.291) 
Aid (t-1) squared -0.002 (0.003) -0.006 (0.005) 
UNSC (t-2) -1.242 (1.801) -1.411 (3.937) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1) -1.480**  (0.666) -0.333 (1.527) 
First difference? Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.15 0.31 
Number of Observations 103 94 
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita. All “Burnside and Dollar” regressions 
include Initial GDP/capita, Ethnic Fractionalization, Assassinations, Ethnic 
Fractionalization*Assassinations, a dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa, Institutional Quality, M2/GDP 
(lagged), Policy, and period dummies. The dependent variable covers the 1970-2005 period 
(corresponding to Clemens et al. 2012, Table 7, columns 1 and 7). All “Rajan and Subramanian” 
regressions include Initial GDP/capita, Initial Policy, (log) Initial Life Expectancy, Geography, 
Institutional Quality, (log) Inflation, Initial M2/GDP, Budget Balance/GDP, Revolutions, Ethnic 
Fractionalization, period dummies and a dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa. The dependent variable covers 
the 1966-2005 period (using the full extended sample provided by Clemens et al. 2012, Table 9). Standard 
errors in parentheses (clustered at the recipient country level). ** p<0.05. 
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Table 3: Politically motivated aid and growth, OLS, BdM/Smith 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4)  
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
UNSC (t)  -1.203 (1.316)             
UNSC (t-2)     -1.611 (1.287) -0.307 (1.401) 3.420* (1.979) 
Aid (t-1)         0.493*** (0.159) 0.440** (0.191) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1)         -0.199** (0.097) -0.381*** (0.120) 
Sample all all all Africa 
Country Fixed Effects No No No No 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Trend Variables No No No No 
Adj. R-Squared 0.26 0.26 0.17 0.13 
Number of Observations 3516 3516 3378 1272 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
UNSC (t)  -0.523 (0.999)       
UNSC (t-2)   -0.763 (1.180) -0.93 (1.299) 2.774* (1.568) 
Aid (t-1)     0.273*** (0.103) 0.247 (0.170) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1)     -0.024 (0.077) -0.175*** (0.060) 
Sample all all all Africa 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects No No No No 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Trend Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.41 
Number of Observations 3516 3516 3378 1272 
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita for the 1960-2005 period. All regressions include (log) Population Size, (log) GDP 
per capita, the level of Democracy and its interaction with UNSC Membership. The sample is based on the data made available by BDM/Smith, 
Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the recipient country level). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Politically motivated aid and growth, OLS, BD and RS, by regime type 
  
Democracy  Autocracy 
  
 Burnside and Dollar Rajan and Subramanian  Burnside and Dollar Rajan and Subramanian  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Aid (t-1) 0.071 (0.115) 0.247* (0.137) 0.171 (0.132) 0.082 (0.106) 
UNSC (t-2) -0.014 (0.994) 0.381 (1.500) -2.315 (1.474) -1.119 (2.062) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1) -0.236 (0.412) 0.712 (1.235) -1.106*** (0.328) -0.781 (0.602) 
First difference? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.31 0.35 0.14 0.26 
Number of Observations 122 115 195 230 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Aid (t-1) 0.521**  (0.208) 0.498* (0.265)  0.440* (0.249) 0.238 (0.170) 
Aid (t-1) squared -0.010**  (0.004) -0.007 (0.005) -0.009* (0.005) -0.005 (0.005) 
UNSC (t-2) -0.053 (0.994) 0.225 (1.500) -2.249 (1.485) -1.183 (2.046) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1) -0.825* (0.460) 0.174 (1.385) -1.230*** (0.323) -0.973 (0.649) 
First difference? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.32 0.36 0.15 0.26 
Number of Observations 134 115 220 230 
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita. All “Burnside and Dollar” regressions include Initial GDP/capita, Ethnic 
Fractionalization, Assassinations, Ethnic Fractionalization*Assassinations, dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia, Institutional Quality, 
M2/GDP (lagged), Policy, and period dummies. The dependent variable covers the 1970-2005 period (corresponding to Clemens et al. 2012, Table 
7, columns 1 and 7). All “Rajan and Subramanian” regressions include Initial GDP/capita, Initial Policy, (log) Initial Life Expectancy, Geography, 
Institutional Quality, (log) Inflation, Initial M2/GDP, Budget Balance/GDP, Revolutions, Ethnic Fractionalization, period dummies and dummies 
for Sub-Saharan Africa. The dependent variable covers the 1966-2005 period (using the full extended sample provided by Clemens et al. 2012, 
Table 9). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the recipient country level). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Politically motivated aid and growth, OLS, BdM/Smith, by regime type 
  Democracy Autocracy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
UNSC (t-2) -2.518*** (0.810) -2.307** (0.973) -0.057 (1.644) 0.009 (1.387) 
Aid (t-1) 0.018 (0.056) -0.034 (0.096) 0.359 (0.271) 0.288 (0.334) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1) 0.257** (0.122) 0.064 (0.145) -0.237* (0.126) -0.100 (0.093) 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Trend Variables No Yes No Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.50 0.75 0.17 0.50 
Number of Observations 889 889 2295 2295 
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita for the 1960-2005 period. All regressions include (log) Population Size, (log) per 
capita GDP, the level of democracy and its interaction with temporary UNSC Membership. The sample is based on the data made available by 
BDM/Smith, Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the recipient country level). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6: Politically motivated aid and growth, different timelines 
 Burnside-Dollar Rajan-Subramanian Bueno de Mesquita-
Smith 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Aid (t) *UNSC (t) -0.432 (0.471) 0.074 (0.333) 0.050 (0.076) 
Aid (t) *UNSC (t-1) 0.272 (0.475) 0.014 (0.507) -0.042 (0.115) 
Aid (t) *UNSC (t-2) 0.200 (0.165) -0.217 (0.506) 0.021 (0.101) 
Aid (t-1) *UNSC (t-1) 0.038 (0.418) 0.479 (0.482) -0.196*** (0.058) 
Aid (t-1) *UNSC (t-2) -1.222*** (0.364) -1.365** (0.647) -0.024 (0.077) 
Aid (t-2) *UNSC (t-2) -0.029 (0.469) -0.079 (0.105) -0.048 (0.090) 
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita. Columns 1 and 2 are based on Table 1, 
columns 7 and 8, respectively. Column 3 is based on column 7 in Table 3. All “Burnside-Dollar” 
regressions are in first differences and include Initial GDP/capita, Ethnic Fractionalization, 
Assassinations, Ethnic Fractionalization*Assassinations, dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia, 
Institutional Quality, M2/GDP (lagged), Policy, aid squared and period dummies. The “Rajan-
Subramanian” regressions are in first differences and include Initial GDP/capita, Initial Policy, (log) Initial 
Life Expectancy, Geography, Institutional Quality, (log) Inflation, Initial M2/GDP, Budget Balance/GDP, 
Revolutions, Ethnic Fractionalization, aid squared, period dummies and dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa 
and East Asia. “Bueno de Mesquita-Smith” includes (log) Population Size, (log) per capita GDP, the level 
of Democracy and its interaction with UNSC Membership, country fixed effects, year dummies and 
regional trend variables. All sources and periods covered correspond to the tables above; variation in 
samples arises from differences in the lag-structures. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the 
recipient country level). ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 7: Aid and temporary UNSC Membership according to sectors 
Sectoral allocation of total aid committed, 1973-2011, constant million 2011 US$ 
  Mean   t-test  
Sector 
Non-UNSC 
member 
UNSC member Increase in %  p-value 
Education 37.62 56.36 50% 0.74 
Health 27.48 34.70 26% 0.07 
Population 25.79 40.38 57% 0.85 
Water and Sanitation 36.62 68.99 88% 0.10 
Government /Civil Society 47.78 56.19 18% 0.01 
Other Social Infrastructure 18.44 37.74 105% 0.01 
Transport and Storage 62.16 93.57 51% 0.84 
Communication 10.38 19.70 90% 0.96 
Energy Generation and Supply 53.87 100.60 87% 0.73 
Banking and Financial Services 13.30 16.93 27% 0.33 
Business and other Services 10.14 11.15 10% 0.40 
Agriculture and Fishing 53.73 138.60 158% 0.56 
Industry/Mining 26.75 69.36 159% 0.22 
Trade/Tourism 4.85 5.33 10% 0.58 
Environment 14.48 37.49 159% 0.05 
Other Multisector 32.96 45.04 37% 0.04 
General Budget support 81.13 118.40 46% 0.04 
Food Aid 29.10 46.36 59% 0.01 
Other Commodity Assistance 33.78 64.37 91% 0.89 
Debt 78.08 110.00 41% 0.72 
Emergency Reponse 27.50 16.86 -39% 0.00 
Reconstruction Relief 14.47 11.37 -21% 0.25 
Disaster Prevention 3.26 1.95 -40% 0.24 
Admin of Donors 1.73 2.12 23% 0.59 
Refugees 3.33 1.92 -42% 0.22 
Unspecified 7.03 12.79 82% 0.41 
Notes: Differences in aid commitments by aid type for temporary UNSC and non-UNSC members. The t-
value indicates significance of the difference between the shares of the respective aid type for UNSC and 
non-UNSC members. Data source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) aid activities database. 
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Table 8: Aid and UNSC Membership according to type of aid 
Allocation of total aid committed, 1973-2011, constant million 2011 US$ 
 Mean t-test  
Type of Aid 
Non-UNSC 
member 
UNSC 
member Increase in % p-value 
Budget Aid 69.71 203.60 192% 0.00 
Project Aid 240.20 469.40 95% 0.00 
Tied Aid 66.44 121.20 82% 0.00 
Partially tied Aid 85.40 181 112% 0.00 
Untied Aid 275.10 489.50 78% 0.00 
Loans 229.60 545.10 137% 0.00 
Grants 268.80 354.60 32% 0.03 
Notes: Differences in aid commitments by aid type for UNSC members and non- members. The 
t-value indicates significance of the difference between the shares of the respective aid type for 
UNSC members and non-members. Data source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) 
aid activities database. 
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Appendix A: Definitions and sources  
Variable  Definition Original Source 
UNSC 
Membership 
Share of years a country has served 
as a temporary member on the 
UNSC in a given period. 
Dreher et al. (2009b) 
US Bilateral 
Development 
Aid 
Official Development Aid 
Disbursements from the US in % of 
GDP. 
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a ODA 
Disbursements, February 2012 
 
Democracy Dummy that is 1 if the country is a 
Democracy during at least half the 
period under consideration. 
Cheibub et al. (2010) 
Dummy for 
Africa 
Dummy that is 1 if the recipient is 
an African country. 
World Bank (2012) 
Burnside and Dollar specification (4-year periods) 
GDP p.c. 
growth 
Average over annual growth rates 
of real GDP p.c. based on constant 
local currency. 
World Bank (2007)* 
Net ODA ODA (OA) total net in % of GDP.  DAC (2007), Table DAC2a* 
Region 
Dummies 
Dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa 
and East Asia. 
Clemens et al. (2012) 
Log Initial 
GDP/capita 
Logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in 
International prices. 
Penn World Tables 6.2* 
Budget Balance Overall Budget Balance, including 
grants. Measured as cash 
surplus/deficit in % of GDP. 
World Bank (2005, 2007), IMF 
(2005)* 
Inflation Natural log of  
(1+ Consumer Price Inflation). 
World Bank (2005, 2007), IMF 
(2005)* 
M2 (% of GDP) Money and Quasi-Money (M2)  
in % of GDP. 
World Bank (2007)* 
Institutional 
Quality 
First non-missing value of the 
ICRG composite index [0, 10]. 
ICRG* 
Assassinations Average number of Assassinations 
in a given phase. 
Banks (2012, 2007)* 
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Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization in a 
country in a given period. 
Easterly and Levine 
(1997), Roeder (2001)* 
Assassinations x 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
Interaction between Assassinations and 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization. 
Banks (2012, 2007), 
Easterly and Levine 
(1997), Roeder (2001)* 
Policy Good Policy Index based on Budget 
Balance/GDP, Inflation and Trade 
Openness (cf. Burnside and Dollar 
2000). 
Clemens et al. (2012) 
Openness Wacziarg-Welch (2008) extension of the 
initial Sachs and Warner (1995) 
Openness Index. 
Wacziarg and Welch 
(2008), updated by 
Clemens et al. (2012)* 
Rajan and Subramanian specification (5-year periods) 
GDP p.c. 
Growth 
Average annual growth rate of real GDP 
p.c. in constant International Dollars. 
Penn World Tables 6.2 
and World Bank (2007) 
for the year 2005* 
Net ODA ODA total net in % of GDP.  DAC (2007), Table 
DAC2a* 
Log Initial 
GDP/capita 
Logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in 
International Prices. 
Penn World Tables 6.2* 
Institutional 
Quality 
Period averages of the sum of three 
components (Bureaucratic Quality, Rule 
of Law and Corruption) of the ICRG 
index, normalized to one. 
ICRG* 
Geography Combination of the average number of 
frost days per month in winter and the 
fraction of a country’s area in the 
tropics. 
Bosworth and Collins 
(2003)* 
Revolutions Average number of Revolutions in a 
period. 
Banks (2007)* 
Initial Life 
Expectancy 
Natural logarithm of first non-missing 
value in each period of Total Life 
Expectancy. 
World Bank (2007)* 
Inflation Natural log of (1+consumer price 
inflation). 
World Bank (2005, 2007), 
IMF (2005)* 
Budget Balance Overall Budget Balance, including World Bank (2005, 2007), 
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grants. Measured as cash surplus/deficit 
as % of GDP. 
IMF (2005)* 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization in a 
country in a given period. 
Easterly and Levine 
(1997), Roeder (2001)* 
Initial Policy First non-missing value of the Wacziarg-
Welch openness dummy. 
Wacziarg and Welsh 
(2008)* 
M2 (% of GDP) Money and quasi-money (M2) in % of 
GDP. 
World Bank (2007)* 
 
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith specification 
Democracy POLITY IV Democracy Index, in 
the last year of the previous 
period, transformed to a [0,1] 
scale.  
Marshall and Jaggers (2003)** 
Democracy x 
UNSC 
Membership (t-2) 
Interaction between Democracy 
Index and the share of years the 
country was on the UNSC in the 
respective period. 
Dreher et al. (2009b),  
Marshall and Jaggers (2003)** 
Population Logarithm of Population Size. World Bank (2007)** 
Log Initial GDP Logarithm of Initial GDP p.c. (in 
constant 2000 US$). 
World Bank (2007)** 
Aid Total Aid (bilateral and 
multilateral) in % of GDP. 
World Bank (2007)** 
GDP p.c. growth GDP p.c. growth rate over a four-
year-period in constant 2000 US$. 
World Bank (2007)** 
 
Notes: DAC is the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee; ICRG is the International Country Risk 
Guide. 
 
* Our source is Clemens et al. (2012), http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/CRBB-Replication-
Files.zip, accessed 06.06.2012. 
More details are provided in “Technical Appendix to Counting chickens when they hatch: Timing and 
the effects of aid on growth,” 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/counting_chickens_technical_appendix.pdf, accessed 
06.06.2012. 
 
** Our source is Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), 
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/staging/IO/5347/PerniciousEffectUNSC.zip, accessed 08.12.2012. 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Count Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max. 
Burnside and Dollar specification (4-year-periods)  
GDP p.c. growth 361 1.21 3.35 -12.96 17.05 
Net ODA (% of GDP) 361 4.54 6.27 -0.13 42.52 
Log Initial GDP/capita 361 8.03 0.78 6.14 9.96 
Budget Balance 361 -0.08 0.65 -7.25 4.71 
Inflation 229 0.28 0.45 -0.01 3.22 
M2 (% of GDP) 361 0.28 0.14 0.02 1.02 
Institutional Quality 361 4.35 1.49 1.58 8.14 
Assassinations 361 0.49 1.35 0 11.50 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
361 0.46 0.30 0 0.93 
Policy 361 1.45 1.41 -5.48 3.50 
Openness 229 0.29 0.43 0 1 
Rajan and Subramanian specification (5-year-periods) 
 
GDP p.c. growth 351 1.48 3.06 -12.30 9.36 
Net ODA (% of GDP) 351 4.28 6.05 -0.06 40.27 
Log Initial GDP/capita 351 8.16 0.85 5.85 10.27 
Institutional Quality 351 4.57 1.68 1.58 9.50 
Geography 351 -0.50 0.77 -1.04 1.53 
Revolutions 351 0.26 0.42 0 2.60 
Initial Life Expectancy 351 61.92 10.04 36.55 79.41 
Inflation 351 0.23 0.49 0 4.19 
Budget Balance 351 -0.09 0.52 -5.51 2.35 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
351 0.44 0.30 0 0.90 
Initial Policy 351 0.45 0.50 0 1 
M2 (% of GDP) 351 3.01 7.64 0 49.85 
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Bueno de Mesquita and Smith specification (4-year moving averages) 
Democracy 3378 0.44 0.35 0 1 
Population 3378 15.82 1.53 12.27 20.96 
Log Initial GDP 3378 6.69 1.08 4.49 9.71 
Total Aid (from all 
sources, % GDP) 
3378 6.25 8.29 0 68.30 
GDP p.c. growth 3378 6.89 17.81 -80.73 246.22 
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Appendix C: Full regression specifications 
Table C.1: Burnside and Dollar & Rajan and Subramanian 
  Burnside and Dollar Rajan and Subramanian 
  (1) (2) 
Aid (t-1) 0.453** (0.189) 0.356** (0.148) 
Aid (t-1) squared -0.010** (0.004) -0.007 (0.004) 
UNSC (t-2)  -1.649* (0.992) -0.947 (1.402) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1) -1.222*** (0.369) -1.365** (0.647) 
GDP p.c. growth -4.267* (2.318) -9.920*** (1.432) 
Assassinations -0.255 (0.230)     
Assassinations * Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.439 (0.449) 
    
M2/GDP 0.801 (3.817)     
Policy 0.858*** (0.199)     
Initial Life Expectancy     -0.009 (0.079) 
Initial Policy     0.675 (0.459) 
Inflation     -1.486*** (0.368) 
M2/GDP     -0.023 (0.034) 
Budget Balance     0.131 (0.147) 
Revolutions     -0.767** (0.363) 
First difference? Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.29 0.31 
Number of Observations 361 351 
Notes: Dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita. Full regression results corresponding to 
Table 1, columns 7 and 8. Note that time-invariant variables are dropped in the regressions using first 
differences. All “Burnside and Dollar” regressions include Initial GDP/capita, Ethnic Fractionalization, 
Assassinations, Ethnic Fractionalization*Assassinations, dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia, 
Institutional Quality, M2/GDP (lagged), Policy, and period dummies. The dependent variable covers the 
period 1970-2005 (corresponds to Clemens et al. (2012) Table 7, columns 1 and 7). All “Rajan and 
Subramanian” regressions include Initial GDP/capita, Initial Policy, (log) Initial Life Expectancy, 
Geography, Institutional Quality, (log) Inflation, Initial M2/GDP, Budget Balance/GDP, Revolutions, 
Ethnic Fractionalization, and dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia. The dependent variable 
covers the period 1966-2005 (using the full extended sample provided by Clemens et al. (2012), compare 
their Table 9). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the recipient country level). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01.   
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Table C.2: Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 
  (1)   (2)  
  Coef.  Std. err. Coef.  Std. err. 
UNSC (t-2)  0.273*** (0.103) 2.774* (1.568) 
Aid (t-1) -0.93 (1.299) 0.247 (0.170) 
UNSC (t-2)*Aid (t-1) -0.024 (0.077) -0.175*** (0.060) 
Democracy -4.634** (2.221) -1.671 (2.203) 
Democracy* UNSC Membership (t-2) 0.343 (1.871) -6.063 (4.494) 
Population -41.526*** (12.218) -13.386 (15.991) 
Log Initial GDP -23.804*** (4.735) -16.265*** (5.373) 
Sample all Africa 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects No No 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Regional Trend Variables Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.45 0.41 
Number of Observations  3378 1272 
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita. Full regression results corresponding to 
Table 3, columns 7 and 8. All regressions include (log) Population Size, (log) GDP per capita, the level of 
Democracy and its interaction with UNSC Membership. The sample is based on the data made available 
by BdM/Smith. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the recipient country level). * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix D: Marginal effect of a change in aid 
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